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Abstract 
 
 
This paper begins to resolve a key puzzle in Australian electoral behaviour: Australian 
women are consistently less likely than men to vote for Labor at federal elections.  
This is at odds with two explanations of the gender gap.  The first holds that increased 
education, paid employment and decreased religiosity will reduce women’s 
propensity to vote for conservative parties, instead leading to voting patterns that are 
similar to men’s.  The second emphasises women’s special interests and concerns and 
posits that these lead to policy preferences that differ from men’s and that induce 
women to vote for social democratic parties (Labor).  
 
The paper analyses Australian Election Study data from 1987 – 1998.  Its results 
challenge the applicability of these two theories of the gender gap to Australia.  The 
results show the theories neither adequately explain the voting trends nor indicate 
potential for a pro-Labor vote that surpasses men’s in the near future.  These results 
have a fundamental implication:  Labor’s attempts over the past 15 or so years to 
appeal specifically to female voters on the basis of gender have probably been 
unproductive.  
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THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Why do Australian women continue to be less likely than men to vote for the Labor 
party?  This puzzling pattern counters two key contemporary accounts of gender 
based voting behaviour: one suggests reasons for women to be as inclined as men to 
vote for left-of-centre (Labor) parties; the other theorises that women are, or will be 
even more inclined than men to vote for them.  Is there evidence to indicate that 
Australia is merely in the throes of “catching up” with either of these scenarios?  Or 
are gender gap theories not applicable in Australia?  Answers to these questions 
would add to the growing body of Australian research in this field as well as being of 
interest to political parties who expend a good deal of time, effort and money on 
policy development and election campaign strategies that may be influenced by such 
considerations.    
 
Whilst Australian research has focussed on various aspects of gender differences 
(including partisanship, attitudes towards issues, candidate evaluation etc), much of it 
has concentrated on individual elections and/or has not been concerned specifically 
with voting gaps (e.g. Bean 1994; Renfrow 1994).  This paper therefore examines the 
past five federal elections to extend the existing research and attempt to address the 
above questions.   
 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
Historically women in many western democracies tended to vote for conservative 
parties (Duverger 1955; Almond and Verba 1963; Campbell et al: 1964; Goot and 
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Reid: 1975; Aitkin 1977).  Since about the late 1960s however, theorists began to 
expect that this tendency would abate.  Two expectations have been uppermost in 
mind:  “convergence” – i.e. about the same proportions of men and women voting for 
leftist parties (Labor in the Australian context); and “divergence” – more women than 
men voting Labor (Renfrow 1994).   
 
The convergence account postulated that women’s ‘conservatism’ would decrease  as 
their social situations -- particularly their education, workforce participation and 
religiosity -- became more similar to men’s.  Once they were socialised into, and 
influenced by  similar social settings to men, their political attitudes and behaviour 
(vote) would converge (Aitkin 1982: 326-333; DeVaus and McAllister 1989: 241-
258; Inglehart 1977; Norris 1988: 219; Randall 1982; Tilly and Gurin 1990: 25-30).  
 
Empirical evidence supports convergence in the United States, Britain and many other 
western European democracies especially in the 1970s and ‘80s (see Baxter and 
Lansing 1980; Charlot 1981: 245; Norris 1988 and 1996; Short 1996; Walker 1994).  
In Australia, gender-based political behaviour changes between Aitkin’s 1967 and 
1979 surveys (Aitkin 1982, especially pages 327-333), and McAllister’s calculation of 
the successive decreases in Labor’s voting gender gap from 9 percentage points in 
1967 to 2 points in 1990, also strengthened support for the theory (1992: 138).   
 
Curiously however, and contrary to expectations, the gap did not ultimately close, but 
instead widened slightly – to around 6 points in 1993 (Renfrow 1994), and 5 in 1996 
(Renfrow and Gow 1996) – before narrowing again in 1998 to 3 points (Renfrow and 
Gow 1999).  Although these relatively small gaps could be due to sampling error, they 
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are nonetheless always there, and always in the same direction.  Whilst convergence 
does not necessarily equate with a consistent zero gender gap, it would be expected 
any gaps would be occasional, small and would vary in direction. Hence earlier --  
apparently supporting -- evidence for convergence in some respects has been eroded.  
On the other hand, although  not examined to any great extent in overseas literature, 
gender gaps in ‘party identification’ (generally a determinant of actual vote) are not, 
and rarely ever have been, evident in Australia amongst non-unionists (Aitkin 
1982:323; Leithner 1997). 
 
The second concept, labelled by Renfrow as the ‘divergence thesis’ puts more 
emphasis on interests and the consequential attitudes towards issues, rather than 
merely social situation influences in determining vote (Renfrow 1994).  In effect the 
divergence account sees voting behaviour going beyond convergence.  It posits that 
women ultimately will combine their long standing compassionate attitudes with new 
interests such as those relating to women’s equality and special needs that were 
championed by the women’s movement (Baxter and Lansing 1980; McAllister 1992; 
Mueller 1988; Norris 1996; Randall 1982; Renfrow 1994; Simms 1981: 97-107).  
Beginning first with the younger groups who will be more attuned to modern 
attitudes, women will take these non-conservative, leftist attitudes to the ballot box.  
This will eventually generate a new gender gap, but this time in the opposite direction 
as their policy preferences logically are expected to be more aligned to 
left/interventionist parties (eg Democratic Party in the U.S., Labor in Australia) than 
the conservative ones (Republicans in the U.S., Liberal/National coalition in 
Australia).  
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The ‘divergence’ concept has been supported by some major overseas studies – 
especially in the United States – both in terms of voting (Baxter and Lansing 1980; 
Norris 1988 and 1996) and also of gender differences in policy preferences  that are 
consistent with the intentions of the women’s movement (Jennings 1990: 237-238; 
Klein 1984; Norris 1996; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986: 42).  However, a European 
study found men’s and women’s voting patterns were merely similar despite women 
having more left-wing attitudes than men (Norris 1988: 223).  Australian research 
also has found some evidence of attitudinal divergence in individual election studies 
(e.g. Renfrow 1994; Sawer and Simms 1993), yet the anti-Labor voting gap remains. 
 
RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This paper tests eight premises that are implicit in convergence theory.  It also tests 
two key premises upon which divergence is based.  It does so in an attempt to 
determine whether Australia is likely to fit either of the models in the near future. 
 
Convergence Tests 
 
First, the convergence account is based upon premises that social changes over the 
past few decades have created/are creating a social structure in which: 
 
1. roughly equal proportions of men and women are receiving at least some tertiary 
education 
2. men and women are in the paid work-force in fairly equal proportions 
3. the proportions of men and women who do not attend church are about the same 
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Further, when this social structure exists, the narrowing of the voting gap initially 
should be more evident among the younger age group, with the overall trend 
increasing as the older age brackets become part of, or at least adapt to the social 
changes, and the oldest generation dies.  Consequently, at least by the 1990s, we 
should expect to find:  
4. no difference in voting patterns between young men and young women 
5. no difference in voting patterns between tertiary educated men and women 
6. no difference in voting patterns between working men and working women 
7. no difference in voting patterns between men who do not attend church and 
women who do not attend church  
8. if differences exist, they are diminishing over time as women’s socialisation into 
their “new” situation in society begins to take effect. 
 
Divergence Tests 
 
For divergence, although some studies extend the range of women’s special interests 
to encompass areas such as health, education and the environment, the majority of the 
literature points in particular to women’s innate compassionate tendencies and their 
liberal attitudes about women’s equality issues as key factors in voting divergence.  
Although Australian studies have established that voting divergence does not yet exist 
in this country, this paper seeks to ascertain whether evidence supports the premises 
that: 
  
1. Australian women are more compassionate than men 
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2. Australian women have more liberal/reformist attitudes about women’s equality 
issues than men 
Conventional wisdom is that these differences are likely to entice women to be more 
pro-Labor than men.  
 
DATA and METHOD    
 
This paper uses data from the Australian Election Studies of 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996 
and 1998.  The studies, conducted to coincide with the five respective and consecutive 
federal elections, provide evidence required to test the ten statements set out in the 
Hypotheses section.  
 
In this study the dependent variable is the vote – specifically the gender gap in vote.  
Employing the process used by McAllister (1992) and Renfrow (1994), the gender 
gap is measured by the proportion of men who vote for the ALP minus the proportion 
of women who do.  When the gap closes there is convergence, and if it goes beyond 
that – a negative result – there is divergence. 
 
Table 1 sets out the independent variables used in the analysis.  As well as the key 
variables used in most overseas and Australian studies, this analysis also includes 
non-unionism.  In light of Aitkin’s and Leithner’s findings with respect to the absence 
of gender gaps in ‘party identification’ for non-unionists, inclusion of the union 
membership variable allows its influence on vote to be compared with that of the 
more widely used ones. 
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Table 1.  Independent Variables  
 
Variable Name Variable Description * 
 
(For Convergence): 
 
 
Tertiary Education Equivalent full-time tertiary study completed: “some” or 
“none”.  
Workforce Participation 1 Occupation in the previous week. Two categories: “in 
work” (full-time or part-time); “not in work”(all other). 
Workforce Participation 2 As above, but with three categories: “work full-time”; 
“work part-time”; “keeping house”. 
Religious Attendance  Frequency of attendance at religious services (apart from 
weddings, funerals and baptisms).  Three categories: 
“never”; “infrequent” (between several times a year to 
less than once a year); “regular” (from more than once a 
week to at least once a month).   
Age Age in years.  Four categories: 18 to 25 year olds; 26 to 
45; 46 to 60; 61 and over. 
Union membership Membership of a union.  Two categories: “yes” or “no”. 
 
(For Divergence): 
 
“Compassion” indicators: 
 
Reduce Poverty Attitudes about the statement that more money should be 
spent on reducing poverty.  Five point response scale re-
coded so that lowest value is most “conservative” 
response and highest is most “compassionate” response: 
1= “strongly disagree”; 2 = “disagree”; 3 = “neither 
agree nor disagree”’ 4 = “agree”; 5 = “strongly agree”. 
Low Taxes or More Social 
Services 
A choice between the government reducing taxes or 
spending more on social services.  Slightly different 
wording on some surveys.  1990 survey offered 7-point 
response scale and other surveys a 5-point response 
scale.  In all cases lowest value is most conservative 
response (strongly in favour of reducing tax at expense 
of expenditure on social services), and highest is most 
compassionate (strongly favour spending more on social 
services rather than lowering taxes).  
Benefits for Aborigines Attitudes about the amount of government help to 
Aborigines.  Slightly different wording in some surveys.  
Where necessary, responses re-coded so lowest value is 
most conservative response (get too much help/help 
gone too far) and highest is most compassionate (get too 
little help/ help not gone nearly far enough.  
Land Rights Attitudes about land rights to Aborigines. Five-point 
ordinal response scale ranging from 1 = “gone much too 
far” (most conservative response) to 5 = “not gone 
nearly far enough” (most compassionate response).  
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Migrant Opportunities Attitudes about equal opportunities for migrants. Five-
point ordinal response scale ranging from 1 = “gone 
much too far”(most conservative response) to 5 “not 
gone nearly far enough” (most compassionate response). 
Migrant Numbers Attitudes about the number of migrants allowed into 
Australia at the present time.  Five-point ordinal 
response scale from 1 = “gone much too far” (most 
conservative response) to 5 = “not gone nearly far 
enough” (most compassionate response). 
 
Women’s Issues: 
 
Job Opportunities Opinion about whether job opportunities are better or 
worse for women than for men.  Slightly different 
wording in 1987 and 1993 questions.  Five-point 
response scale, 1 = much better for women, 3 = no 
difference, 5 = much better for men(much worse for 
women).   
Equal Opportunity 
Changes 
Changes happening in Australia over the years on equal 
opportunities for women.  1987 survey: 1 = “gone too 
far”, 2 = “about right”, 3 = “not far enough”.  All other 
surveys, 5-point response scale from 1 = “gone much too 
far” (most conservative response), through 3 = “about 
right” to 5 = “not nearly far enough”.     
Preferential Treatment Women should be given preferential treatment when 
applying for jobs and promotions.  Ordinal five-point 
response scales re-coded so 1 is most conservative 
response - “strongly disagree” through to 5 being most 
liberal/reformist – “strongly agree”.  
Increase Business 
Opportunities for Women 
The government should increase opportunities for 
women in business and industry.  Ordinal five-point 
response scale re-coded so 1 is most conservative 
response – “strongly disagree” through to 5, most 
liberal/reformist response – “strongly agree”.   
 
* In some cases question wording or response scales varied slightly in the different surveys.  Whilst this precludes direct 
statistical comparisons, the essence of the questions is similar enough in every survey to indicate trends.   
 
 
Age is a key factor in both theories.  Due to ‘catch-up’ times, younger voters are 
expected to be the first to show signs of changed behaviour. As shown in Table 1, 
four age categories are used.  The categories have been chosen to approximately 
coincide with conventional lifecycles: 18 to 25 year olds (young voters); 26 to 45 year 
olds (approximately young marrieds and family groups); 46 to 60 year olds (middle 
aged, generally with different needs and priorities) and 61 and over (around 
retirement and elderly).  
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Table 1 also sets out six indicators to measure the concept of ‘compassion’.  In this 
paper ‘compassion’ embodies an element of social benevolence, of  a belief in ‘taking 
care of the underdog’, or caring for those who are less privileged than the majority of 
Australians.  The indicators listed cover diverse issues that are common to most or all 
of the Australian Election Surveys.  The first two relate directly to welfare 
expenditure within the broad population, the next two tap attitudes about indigenous 
issues and the last two relate to attitudes about migrants. Consistent attitudinal 
patterns over such an array of areas should more strongly substantiate the findings.  
All of these questions offer ordinal response scales and have been re-coded where 
necessary so that the higher a mean value, the more “compassionate” the attitude and 
the lower, the less compassionate (more conservative responses). 
 
Of the four indicators listed in Table 1 for measuring attitudes about “women’s 
issues”, the last two (“preferential treatment” and “increase business opportunities for 
women”) are akin to the notion of “affirmative action” – specific activities that could 
be undertaken to boost opportunities for women.  The question on increasing 
opportunities for women in business and industry is a particularly useful indicator as 
it specifies action by the government.  It should therefore provide clearer evidence of 
attitudes about government intervention in women’s issues.  In all of these questions, 
where necessary, the responses have been recoded so that they range from a lowest 
value equating to the most conservative response through to a highest value equating 
to the most liberal/reformist stance.   
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RESULTS 
 
In order to put into context the results of Tests 1 to 8 for ‘Convergence’ and 1 and 2 
for ‘Divergence’ we need first to look at the nature and extent of the voting gender 
gap.  Table 2 sets out the distribution of men’s and women’s votes, according to their 
responses in the Australian Election Surveys, from 1987 to 1998. 
 
The overall vote 
 
Table 2.  Vote by Sex  
 
Party 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998 
 M 
(%) 
W 
(%) 
M 
 (%) 
W 
(%) 
M 
(%) 
W 
(%) 
M 
(%) 
W 
(%) 
M 
(%) 
W 
(%) 
           
Coalition 42 43 43 43 43 49 51 52 41 44 
ALP 53 49 42 40 50 44 39 34 42 39 
Democrats   4   7 11 14   4    3   5   8    5   6 
Others/ 
None 
  2   1   4   3   4   4   6   6 12 11 
Total 100
* 
100 100 100 100* 100 100* 100 100 100 
(N) 855 919 959 1010 1411 1467 837 894 894 901 
* all percentages rounded.  M = men; W = women.  
 
 
These results reinforce other authors’ findings with respect to the anti-Labor voting 
gender gap.  But interestingly, this does not manifest itself in terms of a long-term 
pro-conservative bent on the part of women.  Comparing men and women, with the 
exception of 1993, and to a lesser extent 1998, women are not any more prone to 
voting for the Coalition than men (i.e. reading across the Coalition row, the Coalition 
vote is about equal for men and women in each election). But, looking exclusively at 
women (ie. reading up and down the columns for women) Labor is clearly less 
popular with women than the Coalition.  Only in 1987 did more women vote for 
Labor than for the Coalition.  Even so, there was still a small anti-Labor gender gap of 
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4 percentage points.  Yet on the whole women’s anti-Labor voting gaps favour the 
Democrats and other parties rather than the Coalition. With the exception of 1993, 
this overall pattern does not support a view of women’s conservatism despite the 
persistence of the anti-Labor gender gap. 
 
The Convergence Tests: 
 
Tests 1 – 3: Social Situation 
Tests one, two and three relate to social situation – the foundations upon which the 
voting convergence account is based.  Recall that women’s propensity to be more 
likely than men to vote for conservative parties is expected to wane once 
approximately equal proportions of men and women are tertiary educated (Test 1), 
equal proportions are in the paid workforce (Test 2) and equal proportions do not 
attend church regularly (Test 3). 
 
Table 3.  Men’s and women’s social situation 
 
Year Undertaken at least 
some tertiary education 
In Paid Work 
(Full or part-time) 
Never attend church 
 Men (%) Women (%) Men (%) Women (%) Men (%) Women (%) 
       
1987 35 31 71 43 43 32 
1990 42 36 68 47 39 31 
1993 65 62 59 42 43 31 
1996 71 69 63 48 44 34 
1998 50 45 63 47 43 36 
 
 
Table 3 sets out evidence that bears upon these three conjectures.  As can be seen 
women have not caught up to men in any of these areas.  For tertiary education the 
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gaps are relatively small, ranging from two percentage points in 1996 to six points in 
1990.  However, the gaps are larger in the religiosity category, ranging from seven 
percentage points in 1998 to 12 points in 1993.  The discrepancy in proportions of 
men and women in paid work (full and part-time workers) is even more substantial.  
The large 28 point gap in 1987 gradually reduced until the 1996 election but was still 
a relatively high 15 percentage points in 1996 and 16 in 1998. Thus, for at least two 
out of the three categories, it appears the premises upon which voting convergence 
theory is founded are not yet in place in Australia. 
  
Theoretically this should result in women being more conservative (and therefore less 
Labor) than men. It would seem then that this may be a partial explanation for the 
consistent – admittedly small – anti-Labor female voting gap.  Yet, as discussed in 
relation to Table 2, women are not particularly more conservative than men.  
 
Tests 4 and 8: Age and vote 
 
Test 4 relates to vote according to the age demographic.  It is expected that the young, 
being at the forefront of the social changes, will therefore lead the way in creating a 
new voting pattern.  Test 4 seeks to establish whether equal proportions of young men 
and young women vote for Labor.  Further, Test 8 you will recall, takes a longitudinal 
perspective for each of the convergence tests.  With respect to age, this requires an 
examination of the progressive voting trend to ascertain whether gender gaps in the 
older age groups reduce over time.  This could be expected as the younger cohorts 
gradually move through the successive age categories and their voting behaviour 
becomes the norm for the overall population. 
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Figure 1  
Voting Gender Gap
(Controlling for Age)
Gender gap: % of men voting Labor - % of women voting Labor
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In Figure 1 each cluster of bars represents the specified age group.  The height of the 
bars shows the extent of Labor’s voting gender gap for each election.  Where the bars 
are below the line there is divergence (more women than men voting Labor).  No bars 
visible (as is the case in 1990 and 1996 for the youngest, 18 to 25 year old, group), 
illustrates convergence (zero gap).  Bars above the line mean fewer women than men 
vote Labor (ie. neither convergence nor divergence has occurred).  
 
As can be seen, over the 12-year time-frame of the analysis there is little to support 
the rationale for the impact of age on voting convergence (Figure 1).  The 18 to 25 
year age group is the most volatile, with differences ranging from -7 percentage points 
(i.e. a gap in the divergence direction) in 1987, to a sizeable 14 percentage points in 
the opposing, conservative direction in 1993 (56% of men and 42% of women 
reported voting Labor whereas the Coalition attracted 46% of the women’s vote and 
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only 35% of the men’s in that year).  This youngest group has been at, or hovered 
around convergence on three of the five occasions but at this stage it exhibits no clear 
voting pattern to support either convergence or divergence.  Further, when looking 
within each of the other age categories (i.e. for each cluster, looking from the bar on 
the left which represents the beginning of the survey period in 1987, to the one on the 
right which represents the end of the period in 1998), there is no clearly defined 
pattern of reducing gender gaps. Nor do the results support the idea of older women 
being more conservative (at least not more so than men) as the older voters sometimes 
have smaller gender gaps than the younger ones.  For example, in 1990 (represented 
by the second bar in the graph for each age group), apart from the youngest group, the 
gaps were smaller for each successive age category.  And, in every survey, for the 61 
and over age group the gap is either less than or equal to at least one of the younger 
age groups (note for example the 1998 result for the over 61s in comparison to the 
gaps in that year for all other age groups).  The 26 to 45 year olds on the other hand 
tend to exhibit bigger gaps than the older age groups in almost every election.  
Paradoxically it would be reasonable to expect convergence amongst the 26 to 45 year 
olds given that they would  have been directly or indirectly exposed to female 
workforce participation and improved education along with changed patterns in 
religious behaviour for all or most of their adult lives.  
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Tests 5 – 8: Gender based voting controlling for “situational” variables 
 
The remaining convergence tests bear upon the apparently influential social situation 
variables.  Tests 5, 6 and 7 will determine whether there are voting gender gaps 
amongst the tertiary educated, the employed and the non-church-goers respectively.  
If convergence theory is to be supported, there should be none.  Test 8 again is to 
determine whether, if gaps do exist, these are reducing over time.   
 
Figure 2 sets out evidence of these inquiries.  It also includes the category “non-
unionist”, as explained in the Data and Method section, to enable comparisons to 
made with this less conventional variable.   Again, the height of the bars represent the 
extent of the voting gender gap for each category. 
 
Figure 2.  
Voting Gender Gap                                                       
(Controlling for Social Situation)
Gender gap: % of men voting Labor - % of women voting Labor
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Setting aside for the moment the “non-unionist” category, Figure 2 shows that, 
contrary to the widely-held theory, anti-Labor voting gender gaps persist in virtually 
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all areas where convergence is expected to occur.  In the “irreligious” category, whilst 
gaps were in the reverse (divergence) direction in the first two surveys, they 
subsequently changed to the anti-Labor pattern, albeit that they were relatively small 
at three and two percentage points by 1996 and 1998 respectively.  In the tertiary 
education and paid workforce categories (the latter labelled “employed” in Figure 2), 
if anything, voting convergence is getting less likely (bars towards the end of the 
period higher than at the beginning).  
 
Workforce participation 
 
In the workforce category, apart from the gender gaps of between three (1990) and 
eight percentage points (1996) between working men’s and working women’s Labor 
votes (Figure 2), Table 4 shows that Labor fares virtually no better from working 
women voters than from their house-bound contemporaries.  This counters 
explanations for a higher Labor orientation amongst working women (De Vaus and 
McAllister 1989: 257; McAllister 1992: 137-138).  
 
Table 4.  ALP Votes from non-working and full time working women. 
 
 
Election Year % of women keeping house 
who voted ALP 
% of women working full-time 
who voted ALP 
1987 48 48 
1990 41 41 
1993 44 45 
1996 37 36 
1998 38 40 
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Union Membership 
 
Finally, although not commonly investigated in gender gap studies, the impact of non-
union membership on gender differences in party identification explored by Leithner 
(1997) is, as might be expected, equally applicable to voting behaviour. In the five 
election surveys, amongst non-union members, voting gender gaps were either 
virtually non-existent or they were marginally in the direction of divergence (Figure 
2).  Yet there were sizeable gender gaps amongst unionists -- 11, 5, 13, 12 and 12 
percentage points in the 1987, ’90, ’93, ’96 and ’98 surveys respectively (not 
illustrated in graph).  This counters any notion that moving into the workforce and 
becoming “unionised” will “Laborise” women.  
 
 
The Divergence Tests 
 
Test 1: Compassion 
Test 1 seeks to determine whether Australian women are more compassionate than 
men.  Using the conceptualisation and indicators outlined in the Data and Methods 
section, if women are compassionate it could be expected they would be in favour of: 
spending to reduce poverty; spending more on social services, albeit at the expense of 
lower taxes; providing benefits for Aborigines; land rights; ensuring equal 
opportunities for migrants; and the current level of immigration.  If they are more 
compassionate than men it is reasonable to expect that the mean of their attitudes in 
these areas would be higher than men’s – and that this would be a fairly consistent 
pattern.   
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Table 5 has been produced after calculation of mean results for the indicators.  It 
shows whether women score higher means than men (except on the question of 
government benefits for Aborigines in 1990 when a cross-tabulation was calculated 
because of a “don’t know” response category).       
 
Table 5.  Gender Differences in compassion (based on Mean results) 
 
 
Issue Women higher on “compassion” scale than men 
 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998 
Spend to reduce 
poverty 
YES 
 
YES YES n/a n/a 
Low taxes or more 
social services 
YES YES NO YES NO 
Benefits for 
Aborigines 
YES YES+ YES NO 
 
No gender 
difference 
Land Rights YES YES n/a YES YES 
 
Migrant 
opportunities 
n/a NO YES YES YES 
Migrant numbers n/a NO NO NO NO 
 
+ Cross tabulation, not means, as question included “don’t know” option 
n/a:  not applicable – question not asked 
 
  
As Table 5 shows, women scored higher on the compassion scale (barely so in some 
cases) in 16 of the 25 instances in which the questions were included in the surveys.  
Women were lower on the scale on eight occasions and there was no difference in 
attitudes about government benefits to Aborigines in 1998.  However, the 16 positive 
results in some respects belie the real picture. Although they are in the anticipated 
direction, they are not necessarily indicative of women’s compassion, nor of potential 
for voting divergence. 
 
Men and women both were relatively favourably disposed towards the notion of 
spending more to reduce poverty in each of the three surveys that this question was 
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put, with women slightly more inclined to agree than men.  In each instance, mean 
values were between 3 and 4, indicating attitudes between “neither agree nor 
disagree” (or “not sure” which was the mid-point wording in 1987) and “agree”.   
 
Despite this proclivity towards welfare spending in those particular circumstances, 
when confronted with a choice between lower taxes and spending more on social 
services, men and women alike tended to prefer lower taxes.   The mean responses for 
both sexes in all surveys were at the conservative end of the scale and, of note, in both 
1993 and 1998, women were slightly more conservative (i.e. less “compassionate”) 
than men on this question (mean of 2.28 for women compared with 2.34 for men in 
1993 and 2.56 for women compared with 2.63 for men 1998 – between “mildly 
favour less tax” and “it depends”).  A point of note is that tax – specifically a goods 
and services tax – was a key election campaign issue on both of these occasions.  
 
Conservative attitudes are also evident, on the part of both men and women, on 
indigenous issues. Although women tended to be a little closer to the “compassionate” 
side of the response scale than men on the question of government benefits for 
Aborigines in the three earlier surveys, they were marginally more conservative than 
men in 1996 (mean of 2.35 for women and 2.37 for men on the five point response 
scales, representing a view between that of help had “gone too far” and was “about 
right”).  
 
In all four surveys in which the land rights question was put (not included in 1993), 
attitudes did not reach the “compassionate” end of the spectrum for either sex.  For 
example, the men’s mean of 1.48 and women’s 1.59 in the 1987 three-point response 
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scale is a value between the view that changes in land rights had  “gone too far” and 
that they were “about right”.  In the subsequent surveys responses were on a broader 
five-point scale but mean values on all occasions remained between “gone to far” and 
“about right” for both men and women, and the gaps reduced in each successive 
election (gaps of .17, .12, and finally .06 in 1998 with men’s mean of 2.43 and 
women’s of 2.49). 
 
Conservative – rather than compassionate -- attitudes also are evident on issues 
concerning migrants.  Notably, this is more marked for women than for men, 
particularly with regard to migrant numbers.  In all four surveys in which the migrant 
numbers question was included, women were more intolerant of the situation than 
men (though only marginally so in most cases), with the central tendency generally 
close to the opinion that Australia had gone too far in allowing so many migrants into 
the country.  The smallest gap was a negligible .01 in 1998 when both mean levels 
were at their most generous (men’s was 2.50 and women’s was 2.49), and the largest 
gap was .16 in 1990 with men’s mean value being 2.31 and women’s 2.15 (all on five 
point scales).  The mean levels were particularly low in 1993 (2.00 for men and only 
1.98 for women).  In dropping below a mean level of 2 women were thus moving in 
an even more negative direction towards an attitude of “gone much too far”.  
 
Women did not reach the compassionate side of the spectrum on the issue of equal 
opportunities for migrants either.  However the attitudinal differences between men 
and women were consistently small, with the biggest being .06 in 1998 on five point 
scales.  
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“Compassion” implications 
 
Contrary to popular belief therefore, it is not a foregone conclusion that women hold 
more compassionate attitudes than men.  As Table 5 shows, in not one of the three 
broad areas analysed – welfare expenditure, indigenous issues or migrant issues – did 
women consistently score higher mean values than men.  Also, although the 
differences in the majority of indicators analysed were in the right direction, they 
were generally small and, more importantly, with one exception the women’s mean 
never moved into the compassionate end of the scale.  The exception was the question 
of whether more money should be spent to reduce poverty.  In all three surveys in 
which this was asked the central tendency for both men and women was on the 
compassionate side. 
 
Further, the small differences in compassion attitudes would not necessarily have 
augured well for Labor amongst women, as the party was increasingly coming under 
attack even from traditional socialists in the late 1980s and into the 1990s for veering 
from its Objective to manage and humanise capitalism (Jaensch 1989: 162-163).  
 
Test 2: “Women’s” Issues 
 
Test 2 is to establish whether Australian women are more liberal/reformist in their 
attitudes about women’s equality issues than men.  If this is the case, the means of 
women’s responses to the indicators as outlined in Table 1 (Data and Method section) 
should be higher than those of men’s.  Table 6 illustrates the outcome of these 
calculations.   
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Table 6.  Gender differences in attitudes to “women’s” issues (based on mean results) 
 
Year Issue  Women higher on 
liberal/reformist scale 
than men 
Job opportunities for women YES 
Equal opportunity changes YES 
Preferential Treatment n/a 
1987 
Govt. should increase women’s work 
opportunities 
n/a 
Job opportunities for women n/a 
Equal opportunity changes YES 
Preferential Treatment n/a 
1990 
Govt. should increase women’s work 
opportunities 
n/a 
Job opportunities for women YES 
Equal opportunity changes YES 
Preferential Treatment YES 
1993 
Govt. should increase women’s work 
opportunities 
YES 
Job opportunities for women n/a 
Equal opportunity changes YES 
Preferential Treatment YES 
1996 
Govt. should increase women’s work 
opportunities 
 
YES 
Job opportunities for women n/a 
Equal opportunity changes YES 
Preferential Treatment YES 
1998 
Govt. should increase women’s work 
opportunities 
 
YES 
 
n/a not applicable -- question not asked 
 
 
As can be seen, unlike the “compassion” measures, Australian women are more 
liberal/reformist than men on all “women’s issue” indicators tested (Table 6).  
 
Women were more negative than men about women’s job opportunities in both 
surveys that this question was put.  For example, in 1987 the men’s mean of 3.12 and 
the women’s of 3.38 (on a five-point scale ranging from “much better” for women to 
“much worse” for women) puts opinions generally between the view that there is “no 
difference” between men’s and women’s job opportunities and that the situation is 
“worse” for women – and the results were similar in the 1993 survey.  However, this 
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is somewhat deceptive as the data also show that there is not a majority of women in 
the electorate who believe that they have an unfair deal in the job market in 
comparison to men.  In 1987, half of the women surveyed said either that there was no 
difference between men’s and women’s job opportunities or that opportunities were 
better for women (37% and 13% respectively).  A slightly bigger proportion fell into 
that category in 1993.  
 
Figure 3  
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The broader concept of equal opportunities for women (ie. not merely their job 
opportunities) was a major focus of the women’s movement demands from the 1960s. 
Figure 3 provides a more detailed picture of men’s and women’s attitudes to this issue 
than can be gleaned from Table 6.  The height of the bars represents the mean 
responses, with higher bars representing more liberal/reformist attitudes.  Figure 3 
shows women consistently were inclined to think changes in equal opportunities for 
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them needed to go further.  The difference in attitudes was most notable in the two 
earlier surveys (1987 and 1990) when the mean values for men and women were on 
different sides of the conservative-liberal attitude spectrum.  In 1987, the men’s mean 
of 1.83 falls between “gone too far” and “about right” (on a three-point response 
scale), whereas the women’s mean of 2.03 is on the “not gone far enough” side of the 
scale. A similar situation occurred in 1990 when 3 (“about right”) was the mid-point 
on the five point scale: women’s mean 3.17 and men’s 2.90.  However, in the last 
three surveys both men and women were leaning towards the reformist stance – with 
all mean values being above 3, denoting a central tendency for attitudes to be between 
“about right” and “not gone far enough”.  Australian men therefore also seem to have 
developed liberal attitudes about women’s equality.  
     
The results on the question of giving women preferential treatment in job and 
promotion applications however, are quite different to the above two issues.  Here, 
men and women have markedly conservative attitudes, although less so for women.  
In 1996 for example, 75% of men and 67% of women either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed that women should be given preferential treatment.  The mean results (2.09 
for men and 2.33 for women in 1993; 2.08 for men and 2.32 for women in 1996; and 
2.12 for men and 2.30 for women in 1998) fall between the level of “disagree” and 
“neither disagree nor agree” that such treatment should exist. This apparent conflict 
with the reformist views on the question of “equal opportunities” for women is 
possibly explained by the fact that the “equal opportunities” notion does not imply 
actively providing something for women in preference to men. 
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Table 7.  Government should increase women’s business and industry opportunities 
 
1993 1996 1998 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
2.98 3.39 3.00 3.40 2.99 3.46 
 
5-point Likert response scales re-coded so 1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree. 
 
 
Finally, the question of government intervention to provide increased opportunities 
for women in business and industry arguably is the most telling of all the women’s 
issue results.  Table 7 sets out the mean results for this question. Mean values above 3 
are on the “reformist” end of the scale.  Not only are women on the reformist side, but 
the stark differences between men and women in all three surveys puts women much 
more firmly on the side of intervention in this area than men.  In 1996 almost half of 
the female respondents (49%) and a considerably lower proportion of men (29%) 
“strongly agreed” or “agreed” that the government should increase women’s business 
and industry opportunities.  
 
“Women’s Issues” Implications 
 
At face value the results of Test 2 on attitudes about women’s issues show the 
differences between men and women are in the right direction to potentially lead to 
voting divergence.  However, this does not necessarily substantiate the divergence 
account of voting within the Australian context at this point.   
 
For example, despite a sizeable proportion of women expressing negative views about 
their job opportunities in comparison to men’s, a still relatively high proportion of 
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women were not concerned, mostly believing there was no difference in the job 
market stakes. These results gel with overseas research showing women are not a 
unified political bloc and that women are quite divided on such key questions as 
whether “the woman’s place” is properly in the home and how much discrimination 
there is against women  (Sears and Huddy 1990: 250-251). Hence, even if Labor was 
perceived to have a pro-women’s job opportunity policy, it is questionable whether 
they would be able to capitalise on the attitudinal gap given the similar proportion of 
women who don’t seem to see it as an issue.  
 
Second, although women were always more reformist in their attitudes about equal 
opportunities than men, in the last three surveys Australian men’s attitudes shifted, 
also displaying reformist tendencies on the issue of women’s equality.  Thus the 
difference is merely in terms of extent, not in terms of opposing attitudes. 
 
The issue of women’s clearly stronger desire for the government to provide them with 
better opportunities in business and industry however, is more complex. Whilst on the 
surface this result gels with divergence theory – given that Labor is traditionally 
perceived as an interventionist party -- it does not necessarily point to a potential 
voting gain for Labor.  On the contrary perhaps, as Labor had been in power at the 
federal level in Australia for more than a decade when the 1993 and 1996 surveys 
were undertaken.  Given that women also were inclined to report that equal 
opportunities had not gone far enough and, in the 1993 survey, that their job 
opportunities were worse for them than for men, it would appear that women may not 
have been satisfied with Labor’s efforts on their behalf.  Though the result does not 
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imply satisfaction with the Coalition either, it does not indicate a potential Labor 
advantage in terms of women’s preferences at the polls.   
Another fundamental point arising from this analysis: nor are Australian women keen 
for radical intervention in the vein of placing them ahead of men – the philosophy of 
creating a ‘level playing field’.  Their responses to the question of preferential 
treatment when applying for jobs and promotions were on the whole quite 
conservative. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper explored ten questions.  By and large it did not find evidence consistent 
with either convergence or divergence. 
 
Labor has suffered a sizeable drop in women’s first preference vote over the period 
examined.  While 49% reported voting for them in the 1987 survey  – the highest 
proportion for the five elections – only 39% of women voted for them in 1998 (See 
Table 2).  This proportion had dropped even lower (to 34%) in 1996 when Labor lost 
government.  However the party has also lost favour with men, dropping 11 points 
from the 53% who voted for them in 1987 to 42% in 1998.  The gap in other words is 
sitting at around the same level after twelve years.  This indicates that “catch up time” 
is not a factor in putting Australia at odds with other western democracies where 
persistent gaps either no longer exist or have reversed direction. 
 
A key factor to arise from this analysis is that although more women gave their first 
preference vote to the Coalition rather than to Labor in the four federal elections of 
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the 1990s (Table 2), the Australian gender gap is not necessarily one of female 
conservatism.  With the exception of the two “GST elections” – 1993 and 1998 – the 
ALP’s gender differences in vote are not going to the Coalition.  Rather, the deficit is 
going to the Australian Democrats.  This party portrays the nurturing image perceived 
to be an important aspect of women’s values, is politically not conservative, yet is a 
far cry from Labor’s traditional image of male (and union) dominance.  Even in 1996 
when the Australian electorate was so disenchanted with Labor it voted the Coalition 
into power for the first time in thirteen years, the Coalition did not benefit from the 
gender gap in Labor’s first preference votes.  
 
In general women’s voting patterns are not markedly different from men’s despite the 
small and persistent anti-Labor gap, but as shown in the results section, this does not 
appear to be explained by convergence accounts of voting. 
 
For Australians, non-membership of unions appears to be the most influential factor 
in eradicating or even reversing sex differences in Labor vote. This gels with 
Leithner’s (1997) and Aitkin’s (1982) findings. This is unlikely to bring much joy to 
Labor however, as non-unionists are typically less likely than unionists to vote for 
Labor.  Two implications arising from this are: (1) a different model to the more 
widely cited “convergence” and “divergence” ones could be more appropriate when 
considering gender as a factor in Australian voting behaviour; and (2) “women-
friendly” policies and strategies developed by Labor over the past couple of decades 
may not be hitting their (female) target within the very same trade union movement 
that gave birth to – and that still exerts considerable influence upon -- the Australian 
Labor Party.  
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On the divergence front, this paper’s analyses show that Australian women’s attitudes 
fall generally within the same ball park as men’s on issues that could be constructed 
as considerations of compassion, and they are mostly at the conservative end of the 
spectrum.  This alone is sufficient to render it inappropriate to generalise that women 
are more compassionate than men.  In addition, in some instances women tend to be 
even more conservative than men on these measures.  
 
Two important factors may also have been working against Labor (ie. against voting 
divergence) in the ‘women’s issues’ arena despite the attitudinal differences 
uncovered in the analyses. First, because Labor was in power for most of the surveys 
analysed, reformist women’s negative attitudes about their status may have been 
directed against Labor.  Second, there is also evidence of polar opposite 
(conservative) attitudes from a sizeable proportion of other women.   
 
The early -1980s  pro-Democrat gender gap in America -- which has subsequently 
been sustained -- was put down in fairly large part to women’s concerns about threats 
to any existing progress on women’s inequalities, plus the potential for no further 
improvements should the Republicans be re-elected (Norris 1988: 231-233).  Whilst 
Australian women tend to differ quite noticeably on some women’s equality issues, 
they might see little reason to flock to Labor to solve those problems.  
 
Given the absence of the pre-conditions for voting convergence, the difference in 
voting behaviour between trade-unionists and non-trade-unionists, the fact that 
Australian women are not particularly more compassionate than men and the 
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contrasting opinions amongst women about “women’s issues” , it is perhaps little 
wonder that Australia has barely arrived at the ‘convergence’ cross-roads, let alone 
moved beyond and into the divergence pattern. 
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